ies.

iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond
Iraq's borders.

v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support,
and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from
non-neighboring Muslim nations.

vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in
Iraq.

vii. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations,
where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad.

viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key
capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).

ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.

x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security,
political, and economic milestones, including better performance on
issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil
revenues, and the dismantling of militias.

RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in
addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and
the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or
meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or
the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting
national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic
presence in Iraq.

2. The Iraq International Support Group

This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes
the active participation of those countries that have a critical stake
in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage their
participation, the United States should immediately seek the creation
of the Iraq International Support Group. The Support Group should also
include all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries
in the region and the world.

The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations or undertakings
on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assist
Iraq in ways the government of Iraq would desire, attempting to
strengthen Iraq's sovereignty--not diminish it.

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's neighbors
are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq
that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not
so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of
the Iraqi state. Each country in the region views the situation in
Iraq through the filter of its particul