opriations.
This means that funding requests are drawn up outside the normal
budget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, and
move quickly to the White House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the
normal review erodes budget discipline and accountability.
Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusing
manner, making it difficult for both the general public and members of
Congress to understand the request or to differentiate it from
counterterrorism operations around the world or operations in
Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget experts are needed to answer
what should be a simple question: "How much money is the President
requesting for the war in Iraq?"
Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive branch
erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing committees
(including the House and Senate Armed Services committees) spend the
better part of a year reviewing the President's annual budget request.
When the President submits an emergency supplemental request, the
authorizing committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the
appropriations committees, and they are pressured by the need to act
quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. The
result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory
review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes loaded
with special spending projects that would not survive the normal
review process.
RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the
President's annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in
its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be
circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented
clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out
its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the
war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.
8. U.S. Personnel
The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has
personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq.
All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by
Americans' lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of
1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of
fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient
communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are
still far too few Arab language--proficient mil
|