with the situation in Iraq
but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. Our
political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring a
responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our
country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a
policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and
Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright
with the American people in order to win their support.

No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point
will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide toward
chaos. If current trends continue, the potential consequences are
severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in
Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States
has special obligations. Our country must address as best it can
Iraq's many problems. The United States has long-term relationships
and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged.

In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group
present a new approach because we believe there is a better way
forward. All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is still
possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an
opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a
critical region of the world, and protect America's credibility,
interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi
government and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and
hopeful future.

What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of
political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative
branches of the U.S. government. It demands skillful implementation.
It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its success
depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political
polarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate
within a democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure--as
is any course of action in Iraq--if it is not supported by a broad,
sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country
toward such a consensus.

We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who have
contributed information and assisted the Study Group, both inside and
outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and around the world. We thank
the members of the expert working groups, and staff fr