hat all we do is only
impulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from without through
the senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind _tanquam in tabula
rasa_. But more profound meditation shows us that all (even perceptions and
passions) comes to us from our own inner being, with complete spontaneity.
297. Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying the
blame upon the gods. Medea in Ovid speaks thus:
_Frustra, Medea, repugnas,_
_Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait._
And a little later Ovid makes her add:
_Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido,_
_Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,_
_Deteriora sequor_.
But one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus say
with far more reason:
_Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,_
_Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?_
298. Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence is
only apparent. For in his _Diss. de providentia Dei actuali_ (n. 61) [307]
he makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects that
present themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial, love or hate, in
such a way that we _do not feel_ we are being determined by any outward
force. He adds that it is when God himself causes our volitions that we act
with most freedom; and that the more efficacious and powerful God's action
is upon us, the more we are masters of our actions. 'Quia enim Deus
operatur ipsum velle, quo efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quod
autem, cum volumus, facimus, id maxime habemus in nostra potestate.' It is
true that when God causes a volition in us he causes a free action. But it
seems to me that the question here is not of the universal cause or of that
production of our will which is proper to it in so far as it is a created
effect, whose positive elements are actually created continually through
God's co-operation, like all other absolute reality of things. We are
concerned here with the reasons for willing, and the means God uses when he
gives us a good will or permits us to have an evil will. It is always we
who produce it, good or evil, for it is our action: but there are always
reasons that make us act, without impairing either our spontaneity or our
freedom. Grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive to
making will operate through fitting motives, such as would be an attention,
_a dic cur hic_, a prevenient pleasure. And it
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