e who admit a free will properly so called will not for that
reason concede to M. Bayle this determination springing from an
indeterminate cause. St. Augustine and the Thomists believe that all is
determined. And one sees that their opponents resort also to the
circumstances which contribute to our choice. Experience by no means
approves the chimera of an indifference of equipoise; and one can employ
here the argument that M. Bayle himself employed against the Cartesians'
manner of proving freedom by the lively sense of our independence. For
although I do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes me
choose between two apparently uniform courses, there will always be some
impression, however imperceptible, that determines us. The mere desire to
make use of one's freedom has no effect of specifying, or determining us to
the choice of one course or the other.

306. M. Bayle goes on: 'There are at the very least two ways whereby man
can extricate himself from the snares of equipoise. One, which I have
already mentioned, is for a man to flatter himself with the pleasing fancy
that he is master in his own house, and that he does not depend upon
objects.' This way is blocked: for all that one might wish to play master
in one's own house, that has no determining effect, nor does it favour one
course more than the other. M. Bayle goes on: 'He would make this Act: I
will prefer this to that, because it pleases me to behave thus.' But [312]
these words, 'because it pleases me', 'because such is my pleasure', imply
already a leaning towards 'the object that pleases'.

307. There is therefore no justification for continuing thus: 'And so that
which determined him would not be taken from the object; the motive would
be derived only from the ideas men have of their own perfections, or of
their natural faculties. The other way is that of the lot or chance: the
short straw would decide.' This way has an outlet, but it does not reach
the goal: it would alter the issue, for in such a case it is not man who
decides. Or again if one maintains that it is still the man who decides by
lot, man himself is no longer in equipoise, because the lot is not, and the
man has attached himself to it. There are always reasons in Nature which
cause that which happens by chance or through the lot. I am somewhat
surprised that a mind so shrewd as M. Bayle's could have allowed itself to
be so misled on this point. I have set out elsewhere the