ies at
once the wisdom, the power and the goodness of God, and yet leaves a way
open for the entrance of evil. God gives perfection to creatures in so far
as it is possible in the universe. One gives a turn to the cylinder, but
any roughness in its shape restricts the swiftness of its motion. This
comparison made by Chrysippus does not greatly differ from mine, which was
taken from a laden boat that is carried along by the river current, its
pace becoming slower as the load grows heavier. These comparisons tend
towards the same end; and that shows that if we were sufficiently informed
concerning the opinions of ancient philosophers, we should find therein
more reason than is supposed.

336. M. Bayle himself commends the passage from Chrysippus (art.
'Chrysippus', lit. T) that Aulus Gellius quotes in the same place, where
this philosopher maintains that evil has come _by concomitance._ That also
is made clear by my system. For I have demonstrated that the evil which God
permitted was not an object of his will, as an end or a means, but simply
as a condition, since it had to be involved in the best. Yet one must
confess that the cylinder of Chrysippus does not answer the objection of
necessity. He ought to have added, in the first place, that it is by the
free choice of God that some of the possibles exist; secondly, that
rational creatures act freely also, in accordance with their original
nature, which existed already in the eternal ideas; and lastly, that the
motive power of good inclines the will without compelling it.

337. The advantage of freedom which is in the creature without doubt exists
to an eminent degree in God. That must be understood in so far as it is
genuinely an advantage and in so far as it presupposes no imperfection. For
to be able to make a mistake and go astray is a disadvantage, and to have
control over the passions is in truth an advantage, but one that
presupposes an imperfection, namely passion itself, of which God is [328]
incapable. Scotus was justified in saying that if God were not free and
exempt from necessity, no creature would be so. But God is incapable of
being indeterminate in anything whatsoever: he cannot be ignorant, he
cannot doubt, he cannot suspend his judgement; his will is always decided,
and it can only be decided by the best. God can never have a primitive
particular will, that is, independent of laws or general acts of will; such
a thing would be unreasonable. He cannot