g freedom with
indetermination, or with indifference that is complete and in equipoise;
and when one maintains that the lack of freedom would prevent man from
being guilty, one means a freedom exempt, not from determination or from
certainty, but from necessity and from constraint. This shows that the
dilemma is not well expressed, and that there is a wide passage between the
two perilous reefs. One will reply, therefore, that Adam sinned freely, and
that God saw him sinning in the possible state of Adam, which became actual
in accordance with the decree of the divine permission. It is true that
Adam was determined to sin in consequence of certain prevailing
inclinations: but this determination destroys neither contingency nor
freedom. Moreover, the certain determination to sin which exists in man
does not deprive him of the power to avoid sinning (speaking generally) or,
since he does sin, prevent him from being guilty and deserving [347]
punishment. This is more especially so since the punishment may be of
service to him or others, to contribute towards determining them another
time not to sin. There is besides punitive justice, which goes beyond
compensation and amendment, and wherein also there is nothing liable to be
shaken by the certain determination of the contingent resolutions of the
will. It may be said, on the contrary, that the penalties and rewards would
be to some extent unavailing, and would fail in one of their aims, that of
amendment, if they could not contribute towards determining the will to do
better another time.

370. M. Bayle continues: 'Where freedom is concerned there are only two
courses to take: one is to say that all the causes distinct from the soul,
and co-operating with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; the
other is to say that they so determine it to act that it cannot forbear to
do so. The first course is that taken by the Molinists, the other is that
of the Thomists and Jansenists and the Protestants of the Geneva
Confession. Yet the Thomists have clamorously maintained that they were not
Jansenists; and the latter have maintained with equal warmth that where
freedom was concerned they were not Calvinists. On the other hand, the
Molinists have maintained that St. Augustine did not teach Jansenism. Thus
the one side not wishing to admit that they were in conformity with people
who were considered heretics, and the other side not wishing to admit that
they were in oppos