d and Holland, and I learnt from them a few good anecdotes on the
affairs of that time. M. Bayle says, p. 2770, that Spinoza studied Latin
under a physician named Franz van den Ende. He tells at the same time, on
the authority of Sebastian Kortholt (who refers to it in the preface to the
second edition of the book by his late father, _De Tribus Impostoribus,
Herberto L. B. de Cherbury, Hobbio et Spinoza_) that a girl instructed
Spinoza in Latin, and that she afterwards married M. Kerkering, who was her
pupil at the same time as Spinoza. In connexion with that I note that this
young lady was a daughter of M. van den Ende, and that she assisted her
father in the work of teaching. Van den Ende, who was also called A.
Finibus, later went to Paris, and there kept a boarding-school in the
Faubourg St. Antoine. He was considered excellent as an instructor, and he
told me, when I called upon him there, that he would wager that his
audiences would always pay attention to his words. He had with him as well
at that time a young girl who also spoke Latin, and worked upon geometrical
demonstrations. He had insinuated himself into M. Arnauld's good graces,
and the Jesuits began to be jealous of his reputation. But he disappeared
shortly afterwards, having been mixed up in the Chevalier de Rohan's
conspiracy.

377. I think I have sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge nor
the providence of God can impair either his justice or his goodness, [352]
or our freedom. There remains only the difficulty arising from God's
co-operation with the actions of the creature, which seems to concern more
closely both his goodness, in relation to our evil actions, and our
freedom, in relation to good actions as well as to others. M. Bayle has
brought out this also with his usual acuteness. I will endeavour to throw
light upon the difficulties he puts forward, and then I shall be in a
position to conclude this work. I have already proved that the co-operation
of God consists in giving us continually all that is real in us and in our
actions, in so far as it involves perfection; but that all that is limited
and imperfect therein is a consequence of the previous limitations which
are originally in the creature. Since, moreover, every action of the
creature is a change of its modifications, it is obvious that action arises
in the creature in relation to the limitations or negations which it has
within itself, and which are diversified by this cha