an inability to do a certain act of will (for example, an act of
love for a man who had just injured him; an act of scorn for a fine sonnet
that he had composed; an act of hatred for a mistress; an act of approval
of an absurd epigram. Take note that I speak only of inward acts, [364]
expressed by an "I will", such as "I will scorn", "approve", etc.) even if
there were a hundred pistoles to be gained forthwith, and he ardently
desired to gain these hundred pistoles, and he were fired with the ambition
to convince himself by an experimental proof that he is master in his own
domain?

402. 'To put together in few words the whole force of what I have just said
to you, I will observe that it is evident to all those who go deeply into
things, that the true efficient cause of an effect must know the effect,
and be aware also of the way in which it must be produced. That is not
necessary when one is only the instrument of the cause, or only the passive
subject of its action; but one cannot conceive of it as not necessary to a
true agent. Now if we examine ourselves well we shall be strongly
convinced, (1) that, independently of experience, our soul is just as
little aware of what a volition is as of what an idea is; (2) that after a
long experience it is no more fully aware of how volitions are formed than
it was before having willed anything. What is one to conclude from that,
save that the soul cannot be the efficient cause of its volitions, any more
than of its ideas, and of the motion of the spirits which cause our arms to
move? (Take note that no pretence is made of deciding the point here
absolutely, it is only being considered in relation to the principles of
the objection.)'

403. That is indeed a strange way of reasoning! What necessity is there for
one always to be aware how that which is done is done? Are salts, metals,
plants, animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate bodies aware how
that which they do is done, and need they be aware? Must a drop of oil or
of fat understand geometry in order to become round on the surface of
water? Sewing stitches is another matter: one acts for an end, one must be
aware of the means. But we do not form our ideas because we will to do so,
they form themselves within us, they form themselves through us, not in
consequence of our will, but in accordance with our nature and that of
things. The foetus forms itself in the animal, and a thousand other wonders
of nature are