opposed to the opinion
of the Jesuits? When, however, one considers the passages that Father Annat
quoted from the works of the Thomists (in a pamphlet entitled: _Jansenius a
Thomistis, gratiae per se ipsam efficacis defensoribus, condemnatus_,
printed in Paris in the year 1654 in 4to.) one can in reality only see
verbal controversies between the two sects. The grace efficacious of
itself, according to the one side, leaves to free will quite as much power
of resistance as the congruent grace of the others. M. Bayle thinks one can
say almost as much of Jansenius himself. He was (so he says) an able man,
of a methodical mind and of great assiduity. He worked for twenty-two years
at his _Augustinus_. One of his aims was to refute the Jesuits on the dogma
of free will; yet no decision has yet been reached as to whether he rejects
or adopts freedom of indifference. From his work innumerable passages [345]
are quoted for and against this opinion, as Father Annat has himself shown
in the work that has just been mentioned, _De Incoacta Libertate_. So easy
is it to render this subject obscure, as M. Bayle says at the conclusion of
this discourse. As for Father Gibieuf, it must be admitted that he often
alters the meaning of his terms, and that consequently he does not answer
the question in the main, albeit he often writes with good sense.

367. Indeed, confusion springs, more often than not, from ambiguity in
terms, and from one's failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideas
about them. That gives rise to these eternal, and usually mistaken,
contentions on necessity and contingency, on the possible and the
impossible. But provided that it is understood that necessity and
possibility, taken metaphysically and strictly, depend solely upon this
question, whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to it
implies contradiction or not; and that one takes into account that
contingency is consistent with the inclinations, or reasons which
contribute towards causing determination by the will; provided also that
one knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination or
certainty, between metaphysical necessity, which admits of no choice,
presenting only one single object as possible, and moral necessity, which
constrains the wisest to choose the best; finally, provided that one is rid
of the chimera of complete indifference, which can only be found in the
books of philosophers, and on paper (for they cannot