hat also, the moment the soul decides in the
affirmative, it of necessity clings to that object until other judgements
of the mind determine it otherwise. Those who expound freedom in this
fashion think to find therein plentiful enough material for merit or
demerit. For they assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from a
free attention of the soul in examining the objects, comparing them
together, and discriminating between them. I must not forget that there are
very learned men' (such as Bellarmine, lib. 3, _De Gratia et Libero
Arbitrio_, c. 8, et 9, and Cameron, in _Responsione ad Epistolam Viri
Docti, id est Episcopii_) 'who maintain with very cogent reasons that the
will always of necessity follows the last practical act of the
understanding.'

310. One must make some observations on this discourse. A very clear
recognition of the best _determines_ the will; but it does not necessitate
it, properly speaking. One must always distinguish between the necessary
and the certain or infallible, as I have already observed more than once,
and distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral necessity. I think also
that it is only God's will which always follows the judgements of the
understanding: all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions, or
to perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call
_adequate ideas_. And although in the blessed these passions always tend
towards the true good, by virtue of the laws of Nature and the system of
things pre-established in relation to them, yet this does not always [314]
happen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good. It is
the same with them as with us, who do not always understand the reason for
our instincts. The angels and the blessed are created beings, even as we
are, in whom there is always some confused perception mingled with distinct
knowledge. Suarez said something similar concerning them. He thinks
(_Treatise on Prayer_, book I, ch. 11) that God has so ordered things
beforehand that their prayers, when they are made with a full will, always
succeed: that is an example of a pre-established harmony. As for us, in
addition to the judgement of the understanding, of which we have an express
knowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses,
and these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of which we
are not always aware. These movements often thwart the judgement of the
practical un