e
will find that, far from taking pleasure in the thought of having
deliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable course, one feels
incredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one is so firmly rooted
in the love of virtue that without the slightest resistance one would repel
a temptation. A man to whom is suggested the doing of a deed contrary to
his duty, his honour and his conscience, who answers forthwith that he is
incapable of such a crime, and who is certainly not capable of it, is far
more contented with himself than if he asked for time to consider it, and
were for some hours in a state of indecision as to which course to take.
One is on many occasions regretful over not being able to make up one's
mind between two courses, and one would be well pleased that the counsel of
a good friend, or some succour from above, should impel us to make a good
choice.' All that demonstrates for us the advantage a determinate judgement
has over that vague indifference which leaves us in uncertainty. But indeed
I have proved sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keep
us in doubt, and have thus given the reason why God is never in doubt. The
nearer one comes to him, the more perfect is freedom, and the more it is
determined by the good and by reason. The character of Cato, of whom
Velleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourable
action, will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable of
wavering.

319. I have been well pleased to present and to support these arguments of
M. Bayle against vague indifference, as much for the elucidation of the
subject as to confront him with himself, and to demonstrate that he ought
therefore not to complain of the alleged necessity imposed upon God, [319]
of choosing the best way that is possible. For either God will act through
a vague indifference and at random, or again he will act on caprice or
through some other passion, or finally he must act through a prevailing
inclination of reason which prompts him to the best. But passions, which
come from the confused perception of an apparent good, cannot occur in God;
and vague indifference is something chimerical. It is therefore only the
strongest reason that can regulate God's choice. It is an imperfection in
our freedom that makes us capable of choosing evil instead of good, a
greater evil instead of the lesser evil, the lesser good instead of the
greater good. That arises from t