tter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the
Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter
will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I
can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough
for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of
recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My
lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the
James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and
south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly
fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its
great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to
extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or
Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville
Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of
from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,
and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be
assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did
at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of
Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do
with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of
supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where
you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canby
would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command
on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these
forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to
Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed
in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.
Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new
base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so
much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans
matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be
the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be
executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forwar