d Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, which
the latter did during that night and the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.
The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at
Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Thomas had
previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two
divisions just returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's division
and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. His
quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized
and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L.
Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general
supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost
without interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so
that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troops
enough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay was
unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so
that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy
strongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was very
bad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground
was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.
But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas
and manage to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, I
apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off
if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate
and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City
Point(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, the
administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would
take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.
It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas
saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he
was making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas
that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.