lavery is wrong. If you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot
logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down.
Judge Douglas declares that if any community wants slavery they have a
right to have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no
wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he cannot
logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong. He insists that upon
the score of equality the owners of slaves and owners of property--of
horses and every other sort of property--should be alike, and hold them
alike in a new Territory. That is perfectly logical if the two species of
property are alike and are equally founded in right. But if you admit that
one of them is wrong, you cannot institute any equality between right and
wrong. And from this difference of sentiment,--the belief on the part of
one that the institution is wrong, and a policy springing from that belief
which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong, and this other
sentiment, that it is no wrong, and a policy sprung from that sentiment,
which will tolerate no idea of preventing the wrong from growing larger,
and looks to there never being an end to it through all the existence of
things,--arises the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends
on the one hand and the Republicans on the other. Now, I confess myself as
belonging to that class in the country who contemplate slavery as a moral,
social, and political evil, having due regard for its actual existence
amongst us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory
way, and to all the constitutional obligations which have been thrown
about it; but, nevertheless, desire a policy that looks to the prevention
of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when as a wrong it may
come to an end.

Judge Douglas has again, for, I believe, the fifth time, if not the
seventh, in my presence, reiterated his charge of a conspiracy or
combination between the National Democrats and Republicans. What evidence
Judge Douglas has upon this subject I know not, inasmuch as he never
favors us with any. I have said upon a former occasion, and I do not
choose to suppress it now, that I have no objection to the division in
the Judge's party. He got it up himself. It was all his and their work.
He had, I think, a great deal more to do with the steps that led to the
Lecompton Constitution than Mr. Buchanan had; though at last,