preme law of the land; that the judges of every State
shall be bound by it, any law or constitution of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding; that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in
that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from
it without breaking it; durable as the instrument; part of the
instrument;--what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from
it? I think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of men capable
of arguing whether, as I state it, in syllogistic form, the argument has
any fault in it:

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United
States.

The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution of the United States.

Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy
the right of property in a slave.

I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the
truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to
understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it as I think, but
the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact is a fault
of the premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is not
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas
thinks it is. I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that
decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed I say,
therefore, that I think one of the premises is not true in fact. But it is
true with Judge Douglas. It is true with the Supreme Court who pronounced
it. They are estopped from denying it, and being estopped from denying it,
the conclusion follows that, the Constitution of the United States being
the supreme law, no constitution or law can interfere with it. It
being affirmed in the decision that the right of property in a slave is
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, the conclusion
inevitably follows that no State law or constitution can destroy that
right. I then say to Judge Douglas and to all others that I think it will
take a better answer than a sneer to show that those who have said that
the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution, are not prepared to show that no constitution or law
ca