ess, in
legislation (as the speeches at the time will show), made to depend upon
each other. Each got votes with the understanding that the other measures
were to pass, and by this system of compromise, in that series of
measures, those two bills--the New Mexico and Utah bills--were passed: and
I say for that reason they could not be taken as models, framed upon
their own intrinsic principle, for all future Territories. And I have the
evidence of this in the fact that Judge Douglas, a year afterward, or more
than a year afterward, perhaps, when he first introduced bills for the
purpose of framing new Territories, did not attempt to follow these bills
of New Mexico and Utah; and even when he introduced this Nebraska Bill, I
think you will discover that he did not exactly follow them. But I do not
wish to dwell at great length upon this branch of the discussion. My own
opinion is, that a thorough investigation will show most plainly that the
New Mexico and Utah bills were part of a system of compromise, and not
designed as patterns for future Territorial legislation; and that this
Nebraska Bill did not follow them as a pattern at all.

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious
distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether unaware that
the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between the
free and slave States. But there is still a difference, I think, between
Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this. I suppose that the real
difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republicans on
the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making any difference
between slavery and liberty; that he is in favor of eradicating, of
pressing out of view, the questions of preference in this country for free
or slave institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards
the idea that there is any wrong in slavery. Everything that emanates from
him or his coadjutors in their course of policy carefully excludes the
thought that there is anything wrong in slavery. All their arguments, if
you will consider them, will be seen to exclude the thought that there is
anything whatever wrong in slavery. If you will take the Judge's speeches,
and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him,--as his
declaration that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or down,"--you
will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that
s