to the necessary development of
Cartesian ideas. And it is undoubtedly true that many points of
similarity with such writers, reaching down even to verbal coincidence,
may be detected in the works of Spinoza, although it is not so easy to
determine how much he owed to their teaching. His own view of his
obligations is sufficiently indicated by the fact, that while in his
ethics he carries on a continual polemic against Descartes, and strives
at every point to show that his own doctrines are legitimately derived
from Cartesian principles, he only once refers to Jewish philosophy as
containing an obscure and unreasoned anticipation of these doctrines.
"Quod quidam Hebraeorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur qui scilicet
statuunt Deum Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem
esse."[32] It may be that the undeveloped pantheism and rationalism of
the Jewish philosophers had a deeper influence than he himself was aware
of, in emancipating him from the traditions of the synagogue, and giving
to his mind its first philosophical bias. In his earlier work there are
Neoplatonic ideas and expressions which in the _Ethics_ are rejected or
remoulded into a form more suitable to the spirit of Cartesianism. But
the question, after all, has little more than a biographical interest.
In the Spinozistic philosophy there are few differences from Descartes
which cannot be traced to the necessary development of Cartesian
principles; and the comparison of Malebranche shows that a similar
development might take place under the most diverse intellectual
conditions. What is most remarkable in Spinoza is just the freedom and
security with which these principles are followed out to their last
result. His Jewish origin and his breach with Judaism completely
isolated him from every influence but that of the thought that possesses
him. And no scruple or hesitation, no respect for the institutions or
feelings of his time interferes with his speculative consequence. He
exhibits to us the almost perfect type of a mind without superstitions,
which has freed itself from all but reasoned and intelligent
convictions, or, in the Cartesian phrase, "clear and distinct ideas";
and when he fails, it is not by any inconsistency, or arbitrary stopping
short of the necessary conclusions of his logic, but by the essential
defect of his principles.

Geometrical method applied to metaphysics.

Spinoza takes his idea of method from mathematics