that year, but
Caesar's friends and agents thwarted their efforts. Pompey was not willing
to have Caesar's command to run beyond 13 November, 49. Cicero, who had
distinguished himself by his uprightness as governor of Cilicia in 51,
strove to effect a compromise, but in vain. Caesar offered to give up
Transalpine Gaul and part of his army, if allowed to retain the Cisalpine
province but the overture was rejected. Finally, in December, 50 B. C., he
formally promised to resign his provinces and disband his troops, if
Pompey would do the same, but the Senate insisted upon his absolute
surrender. On 7 January, 49 B. C., the Senate passed the "last decree"
calling upon the magistrates and proconsuls (i. e. Pompey) to protect the
state, and declaring Caesar a public enemy. Caesar's friends left the city
and fled to meet him in Cisalpine Gaul, where he and his army were in
readiness for this emergency.

III. THE CIVIL WAR BETWEEN CAESAR AND THE SENATE: 49-46 B. C.

*Caesar's conquest of Italy and Spain, 49 B. C.* The senatorial
conservatives had forced the issue and for Caesar there remained the
alternative of victory or destruction. He possessed the advantages of a
loyal army ready for immediate action and the undisputed control over his
own troops. On the other hand, his opponents had no veteran troops in
Italy, and although Pompey acted as commander-in-chief of the senatorial
forces, he was greatly hampered by having at times to defer to the
judgment of the consuls and senators who were in his camp. It was
obviously to Caesar's advantage to take the offensive and to force a
decision before his enemies could concentrate against him the resources of
the provinces. Hence he determined to act without delay, and, upon
receiving news of the Senate's action on 7 January, he crossed the
Rubicon, which divided Cisalpine Gaul and Italy, with a small force,
ordering the legions beyond the Alps to join him with all speed. The
Italian municipalities opened their gates at his approach and the newly
raised levies went over to his side. Everywhere his mildness to his
opponents won him new adherents. Pompey decided to abandon Italy and
withdraw to the East, intending later to concentrate upon the peninsula
from all sides; a plan made feasible by his control of the sea. Caesar
divined his intention and tried to cut off his retreat at Brundisium, but
could not prevent his embarkation. With his army and the majority of the
Senate