l give rise to false impressions. If
American subjects have really lost their lives by the torpedoing
of this ship, it was entirely contrary to the intentions of my
Government, which has authorized me to express to the Government of
the United States their deepest regrets, and their most heartfelt
sympathy."

Fortunately, as already mentioned, orders had been given before
the torpedoing of the _Arabic_, to all submarine commanders that
no liner should be sunk before preliminary warning had been given,
and the non-combatants had been placed in safety, unless any ships
tried to escape or offered resistance. At the end of August I received
an official statement to this effect, intended for my use in the
negotiations over the _Lusitania_ question. This statement caused the
first hitch in these negotiations. The American Government regarded
the term "liner" as comprising every steamer plying on recognized
routes as distinguished from the so-called "tramp steamer." The
German Naval authorities, on the other hand, averred that their
reservation only applied to the large ships of the regular passenger
services. However, this divergence of opinion only became important
at a later date, and was not for the moment an obstacle to our
proceedings.

On the other hand, it was certainly unfortunate for us that up to
the 31st January, 1917, neither of the two contending parties in
Berlin were able to gain complete control in the matter of policy.
I, myself, was never in favor of the submarine campaign, because
I was convinced that it could not fulfil its avowed object, and
would probably involve us in hostilities with the United States;
but bad as this policy was, it would have been better to follow
it consistently than to halt between two opinions.

The submarine campaign was in the end gradually and unwillingly
sacrificed, owing to our desire to placate the United States. If we
had made a clean sweep of it, once and for all, after the _Lusitania_
incident, or, at any rate, after the sinking of the _Arabic_, as we
actually did after the torpedoing of the _Sussex_, considerable
advantages would have been gained from the diplomatic point of view.
To my mind, there was now only one thing to be done--to abandon
our pretensions that the submarine campaign was being conducted
in accordance with the recognized principles of cruiser warfare,
laid down by international law, and to offer compensation for the
loss of the _Lusitania_ and th