he settlement
of the _Arabic_ case really prevented a war with the United States or
not; but your Excellency knows my views that without this settlement
a conflict must eventually have become inevitable. I respectfully
submit that the preservation of peace alone was a sufficient motive
to induce us to come to terms; but you also know that this was by
no means my sole object. I wished also to induce the Government
of the United States to take energetic proceedings against England,
with the object of translating into fact its idea of the freedom
of the seas. I trust we shall not be disappointed in this regard,
and I shall, certainly, leave no stone unturned to keep Mr. Wilson
on the right path. Whatever may be one's personal opinion of the
President, whether one believes him to be really neutrally-minded,
or not, his great services to the cause of peace cannot be denied.
A Republican President would certainly not have stood up, as he
has done, against the united forces of anti-Germanism represented
by Wall Street, the Press, and so-called Society.
"At the present moment it looks as if the American Government are
ready to let the _Lusitania_ matter drop altogether, provided we
agree to refer the question of compensation to the Hague Tribunal
after the war. The general belief here is that judicial proceedings
are out of the question during the continuance of hostilities. At
least I gather as much, indirectly, of course, from one of the
President's friends."
(2) CIPHER
"Cedarhurst, October 15th, 1915.
"I much regret that owing to a mistake on the part of the State
Department, your Excellency was not earlier informed of the settlement
of the submarine question. Mr. Lansing left my letter, which should
have accompanied the telegram, in his writing-table by mistake,
for which oversight he afterwards apologized to me. The Imperial
Embassy was in no way to blame.
"The importance attached by the President, from the very first,
to those main points on which we were unable to make concessions
rendered the task of arriving at an agreement by no means an easy
one. Thus on three of the most important points no agreement has
been reached and over these we must, for the present, draw the
veil. Only a few of the most rabid of the pro-English papers venture
openly to reproach President Wilson with having achieved nothing
but the security of passenger-ships, but all Americans are prepared
to admit in confidence that the G
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