r example a passage in Hume, _Works_ (ed.
1854), iv. 161-162, cf. p. 160, which says, in short, that no argument from
experience can ever carry us beyond experience itself. However well
grounded this reasoning may be, it altogether misses the point at which
Butler aimed, and is indeed a misconception of the nature of analogical
argument. Butler never attempts to _prove_ that a future life regulated
according to the requirements of ethical law is a reality; he only desires
to show that the conception of such a life is not irreconcilable with what
we know of the course of nature, and that consequently it is _not
unreasonable_ to suppose that there is such a life. Hume readily grants
this much, though he hints at a formidable difficulty which the plan of the
_Analogy_ prevented Butler from facing, the proof of the existence of God.
Butler seems willing to rest satisfied with his opponents' admission that
the being of God is proved by reason, but it would be hard to discover how,
upon his own conception of the nature and limits of reason, such a proof
could ever be given. It has been said that it is no flaw in Butler's
argument that he has left atheism as a possible mode of viewing the
universe, because his work was not directed against the atheists. It is,
however, in some degree a defect; for his defence of religion against the
deists rests on a view of reason which would for ever preclude a
demonstrative proof of God's existence.

If, however, his premises be granted, and the narrow issue kept in view,
the argument may be admitted as perfectly satisfactory. From what we know
of the present order of things, it is not unreasonable to suppose that
there will be a future state of rewards and punishments, distributed
according to ethical law. When the argument from analogy seems to go beyond
this, a peculiar difficulty starts up. Let it be granted that our happiness
and misery in this life depend upon our conduct--are, in fact, the rewards
and punishments attached by God to certain modes of action, the natural
conclusion from analogy would seem to be that our future happiness or the
reverse will probably depend upon our actions in the future state. Butler,
on the other hand, seeks to show that analogy leads us to believe that our
future state will depend upon our present conduct. His argument, that the
punishment of an imprudent act often follows after a long interval may be
admitted, but does not advance a single step towards