of the facts of human nature, whence,
Butler thinks, "it will as fully appear that this our nature, _i.e._
constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears
that its nature, _i.e._ constitution or system, is adapted to measure
time." Such analysis had been already attempted by Hobbes, and the result
he came to was that man naturally is adapted only for a life of
selfishness,--his end is the procuring of pleasure and the avoidance of
pain. A closer examination, however, shows that this at least is false. The
truth of the counter propositions, that man is [Greek: phusei politikos],
that the full development of his being is impossible apart from society,
becomes manifest on examination of the facts. For while self-love plays a
most important part in the human economy, there is no less evidently a
natural principle of benevolence. Moreover, among the particular [v.04
p.0885] passions, appetites and desires there are some whose tendency is as
clearly towards the general good as that of others is towards the
satisfaction of the self. Finally, that principle in man which reflects
upon actions and the springs of actions, unmistakably sets the stamp of its
approbation upon conduct that tends towards the general good. It is clear,
therefore, that from this point of view the sum of practical morals might
be given in Butler's own words--"that mankind is a community, that we all
stand in a relation to each other, that there is a public end and interest
of society, which each particular is obliged to promote." But deeper
questions remain.

The threefold division into passions and affections, self-love and
benevolence, and conscience, is Butler's celebrated analysis of human
nature as found in his first sermon. But by regarding benevolence less as a
definite desire for the general good as such than as kind affection for
particular individuals, he practically eliminates it as a regulative
principle and reduces the authorities in the polity of the soul to
two--conscience and self-love.

But the idea of human nature is not completely expressed by saying that it
consists of reason and the several passions. "Whoever thinks it worth while
to consider this matter thoroughly should begin by stating to himself
exactly the idea of a system, economy or constitution of any particular
nature; and he will, I suppose, find that it is one or a whole, made up of
several parts, but yet that the several parts, even considered as