o gain to windward,
and thence return upon Barbadoes, his first proposed conquest. On the
8th of June, off Antigua, were captured fourteen British
merchant-ships, which had imprudently put to sea from that island.
From these Villeneuve got a report that Nelson had arrived with
fourteen ships-of-the-line, to which his imagination added five he
believed to be at Barbadoes. He decided at once to return to Europe,
abandoning all his projects against the British possessions.
Transferring hastily a number of troops to frigates, as garrisons for
the French islands, he sailed the next day for the northward to gain
the westerly winds which prevail in the higher latitudes. Of the forty
days he was to remain in the West Indies--reduced to thirty-five by
subsequent instructions--only twenty-six had passed. Whatever else
might result in the future, Nelson was justified in claiming that his
pursuit, effected under such discouragements, had driven the enemy out
of the West Indies, saved the islands, and, as he added, two hundred
sail of sugar ships. Only extreme imprudence, he fairly maintained,
was responsible for the loss of the fourteen from Antigua.

Nelson himself was off Antigua on the 12th of June, exactly one week
after he left Barbadoes. There he received all the information that
has just been mentioned as to the enemy's movements. A rapid decision
was necessary, if he might hope yet to overtake his fortune, and to
baffle finally the objects of the allies, whatever they might be. "I
must be satisfied they have bent their course for Europe before I push
after them, which will be to the Straits' mouth;" but later in the
same day he has learned that they were standing to the northward when
last seen, and had sent back their troops to Guadaloupe, therefore, "I
hope to sail in the morning after them for the Straits' mouth." That
night the troops were landed, and a brig of war, the "Curieux," was
despatched to England with word of his intentions. At the same time,
while believing the allies were bound back to the Mediterranean, he
recognized that it was possible they might be going farther north, to
one of the Biscay ports, and consequently took measures to notify the
commanding officer off Ferrol to be on his guard. The frigate charged
with this communication was kept with the fleet until the 19th, by
which time he had obtained at sea additional and more precise
knowledge of Villeneuve's direction. This important warning was duly