lute check over the supposed thirty-four unengaged, of the enemy.
The attack as planned, therefore, differed from that executed (1) in
that the lee line was not to advance in column, but in line, thereby
dispersing the enemy's fire, and avoiding the terrific concentration
which crushed the leaders at Trafalgar; and (2) in that the weather
squadrons were not to attack simultaneously with the lee, but after it
had engaged, in order to permit the remedying of any mishap that might
arise in delivering the crucial blow. In both these matters of detail
the plan was better than the modification; but the latter was forced
upon Nelson by conditions beyond his control.
It will be observed that, when considering attacking from to leeward,
he orders a simultaneous movement of the three British
divisions,--lee, weather, and reserve; for the obvious reason that if
he held his own divisions in reserve to leeward he could not at all
count upon bringing them into action at will; and, moreover, such an
attack would probably have to be in columns, and, if simultaneous,
would be less liable to disaster than in succession, mutual support
diverting the enemies' fire. In fact, the highest order of offensive
combination was only possible when having the advantage of the
wind--fair, and enough of it.
The plan upon which Trafalgar was to be fought, as above described and
analyzed, was formed some time before leaving England, and it is not
unreasonable to suppose that it was in fact a modification of the
earlier idea, laid down during the chase to the West Indies. On the
10th of September, three days only before quitting Merton, Nelson
called upon his old friend, Lord Sidmouth,[127] who until recently had
been Prime Minister. In the course of the interview he explained his
intentions as regards the attack. "Rodney," he said, "broke the
enemy's line in one place,[128] I will break it in two;" and with his
finger he indicated upon a table the general character of the assault,
to be made in two lines, led by himself and Collingwood. He felt
confident, according to Sidmouth's narration, that he should capture
either their van and centre or their centre and rear. It was of course
out of his power to prevent the enemy inverting their order, by the
simultaneous turning round of every ship, at the time of engagement,
so that the attack intended for the rear should fall upon it become
the van. Against this contingency he provided by the words, "shoul
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