e of Trafalgar. To aid this purpose
the author has traced, in marginal notes, the succession of the
leading ideas.

After a statement of General Considerations, and a frank attribution
of full powers to the second in command for carrying out his part,
Nelson lays down the manner of Attack from to Leeward. This condition
not obtaining at Trafalgar, the plan cannot be contrasted with the
performance of that day. Upon this follows a luminous enunciation of
the general idea, namely, Collingwood's engaging the twelve rear
ships, which underlies the method prescribed for each attack--from to
leeward and to windward. Of the latter Nelson fortunately gives an
outline diagram, which illustrates the picture before his own mind,
facilitating our comprehension of his probable expectations, and
allowing a comparison between them and the event as it actually
occurred. It is not to the discredit, but greatly to the credit, of
his conception, that it was susceptible of large modification in
practice while retaining its characteristic idea.

Looking at his diagram,[126] and following his words, it will be seen
that the British lines are not formed perpendicularly to that of the
enemy (as they were at Trafalgar), but parallel to it. Starting from
this disposition, near the enemy and abreast his centre, the lee line
of sixteen ships was to bear up _together_, and advance in line, not
in column (as happened at Trafalgar); their object being the twelve
rear ships of the enemy. This first move stands by itself; the action
of the weather line, and of the reserve squadron still farther to
windward, are held in suspense under the eye of the
commander-in-chief, to take the direction which the latter shall
prescribe as the struggle develops. The mere menace of such a force,
just out of gunshot to windward, would be sufficient to prevent any
extensive manoeuvre of the unengaged enemies. Nelson doubtless had in
mind the dispositions, more than a century old, of Tourville and De
Ruyter, by which a few ships, spaced to windward of an enemy's van,
could check its tacking, because of the raking fire to which they
would subject it. Unquestionably, he would not have kept long in idle
expectancy twenty-four ships, the number he had in mind; but clearly
also he proposed to hold them until he saw how things went with
Collingwood. Thus much time would allow, granting the position he
assumed and a reasonable breeze. His twenty-four to windward held an
abso