es to the Mediterranean. Signals were arranged, precise, yet
not so elaborate as to tend to confusion, by which the departure and
general direction of the enemy could be continually transmitted, from
the furthest lookouts to the main body, by night as by day.

On the 13th of October his old ship, the "Agamemnon," joined the
fleet. She was commanded by Sir Edward Berry, who had been first
lieutenant in her with Nelson, had accompanied him in boarding the
"San Nicolas" and "San Josef" at St. Vincent, and was afterwards his
flag-captain at the Nile. When her approach was reported to the
admiral, he exclaimed gleefully, "Here comes Berry! Now we shall have
a battle;" for Berry, having been in more fleet actions than any
captain in the British Navy,[131] had a proverbial reputation for such
luck. The event did not belie the prediction. Five days later, on the
18th of the month, Nelson noted in his diary: "Fine weather, wind
easterly; the combined fleets cannot have finer weather to put to
sea;" and the following morning, at half-past nine, the signal,
repeated from masthead to masthead, from the inshore frigates to their
commander-in-chief fifty miles at sea, announced that the
long-expected battle was at hand--for "The Enemy are coming out of
port."

FOOTNOTES:

[121] May, 1805.

[122] The author does not here understand the speaking of "two or three"
rear ships, when the van is supposed to be five or six--making a total of
not over nine or ten enemies. If this order of attack was issued, as
expressly stated by Clarke and M'Arthur, on the chase to the West Indies,
Nelson then was fully aware that he with ten ships was in pursuit of
eighteen. (See _ante_, p. 296) It appears to the author more probable that
it was issued to the fleet when off Toulon, in anticipation of a possible
meeting with the French squadron there, when the disparity of force was
less--say, eight to ten. This impression is confirmed by the "Plan of
Attack" speaking of the junior "Admirals"--in the plural. There was but one
such in the pursuit to the West Indies. It is quite possible, however, that
the same order was re-issued upon the later occasion, re-copied without
change of words. In any event, it confirms other statements and actions of
Nelson's, that an enemy should not be fought ship to ship, but by a
concentration on part of his order.

[123] Inserted by author.

[124] _Ante_, pp. 306, 323.

[125] _Ante_, p. 82.

[126] The author has in