erations presented by
Nelson in the opening sentences of the Memorandum, and from the great
number of ships he then hoped to have. There were precedents for such
a formation, in the practice of the day; but, as far as recalled by
the author, they were the advanced guards, the skirmish line, of the
fleet, not, as in this case, essentially a reserve. In Nelson's
present thought, the employment of this force would be, not antecedent
to, but consequent upon, the particular indications of the day.
Probably they would not be held back as long--for as distinct
indications--as in the case of an army's reserve; but nevertheless,
the chief object of their separate organization was to redress, at the
moment, the unforeseen developments of a battle, whether at the
instant of engagement or during its subsequent progress. The
unfortunate Villeneuve, who commanded the allies, an accomplished
though irresolute seaman, had adopted a similar arrangement, placing
twelve detached ships under his colleague Gravina; but, with sailing
vessels, the effective use of such a force depended largely upon the
windward position, which the allies did not have. If placed to leeward
of a lee line, it was in the power of the assailant to throw them out
of action altogether; if to windward, to attack them separately;
therefore at Trafalgar Villeneuve ordered them back into the line.
Nelson likewise then embodied his reserve in the two columns of
attack, because he had fewer vessels than he expected, and because the
light wind forbade the wasting of time in evolutionary refinements.
The incident of the simultaneous adoption of the same provision by the
two opposing admirals, however, is interesting as indicative of the
progress of naval thought, though still hampered by the uncertainties
of the motive power.

The second of these Orders, that of October 9, is memorable, not only
for the sagacity and comprehensiveness of its general dispositions,
but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details of
execution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall.
It was evidently drawn up in the first instance for Collingwood only;
the word "your" in the original draught having been struck out, and
"second in command" substituted. The comparison already made between
it and its predecessor of May, may not uninstructively be followed by
a study of the difference in details between itself and the execution
it actually received at the Battl