ered discussion,
but by stray gleams of expression, too often unrecorded, from which we
can infer only the general tenor of his thought. It is in the chance
phrase, transmitted by Stewart, coupled with the change of object, so
definitely announced in the second instance,--the crushing, namely, of
the enemy's great fleet, and not the mere crippling of a detachment
such as went to the West Indies,--that the author thinks to find the
clew to the difference of dispositions, in the first case, from those
prescribed and followed for Trafalgar--the "Nelson touch" that
thrilled the captains. There is again, indeed, in the latter, the
distinct reliance upon confusion, for the line of the foe is to be
broken in two places; but now the confusion introduced is in the part
of the enemy that is assailed, not, as before, in that which is left
out of action. Confusion, in short, is now imposed by external force,
rather than induced by internal perplexity,--a condition surer, and
therefore more liable to result in a crushing victory, for it depends
upon the vigor of the offensive, and not on the weakness of the
defensive, which may prove a deceitful reliance. Moreover, effectual
crushing requires time, even when, as in the final memorandum, a great
concentration of superiority is intended on part of an enemy's order.
Now, when the van and centre are attacked, the rear is pointed fair,
and, if it does not lose its head, comes quickly up to the rescue; but
when, in the contrary case, the centre and rear receive the assault,
the van, being left out of action, not only has to turn round, but
naturally stands away, for an interval dependent upon the initiative
of its immediate commander, as occurred to an extreme degree at
Trafalgar. Thus time, the invaluable five minutes or half hour, is
gained for the offensive to bring its first concentration to a
successful issue, as well as to prepare to repel the van of the
defensive, if it countermarches, as it should. "I look with confidence
to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear, and
then that the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive
their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they
endeavour to make off."
The organization of a distinct body of eight fast-sailing
ships-of-the-line, to be carried to such part of the field as might
appear necessary to the commander-in-chief in a particular emergency,
resulted inevitably, perhaps, from the consid
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