ny possibility can present.

Pending this one great lesson, what is it that the war has taught?

First of all, it has taught once more the old, old lesson that has
been taught by practically every war in which sea power has been a
factor, that where this element is a factor, it is a factor of
decisive importance. The British navy may not win the war for
England, but it is every day more apparent that if the British navy
did not exist, or if it dominated the sea less decisively than it
does, the cause for which England stands would be a lost cause. And
the extraordinary feature of the situation is that the navy is
accomplishing its mission by merely existing. Thus far the "Grand
Fleet" has not struck a blow. From its position on the English coast
it looks across to the mouth of the Kiel Canal, and--waits! Its
patrols are always on guard, the coasts which it defends are never
threatened, and the commerce which trusts to its protection comes
and goes with practically no thought of danger. For several months
during the submarine campaign against commerce, something like
one-half of one per cent of the merchant vessels bound to and from
the ports of England were sunk. But no industry was crippled for a
moment, and neither the necessities nor the luxuries of life were
appreciably curtailed. Even at the height of the submarine
operations, great transports loaded with troops crossed the English
Channel freely, and out of a million and a half of soldiers so
transported not a single one was lost. It is safe to say that in any
three months since the war began the British navy has repaid the
cost of its maintenance for a century in pounds, shillings, and
pence; and in the sense of security which its existence and
efficiency have imparted to the English people, the return upon the
investment has been beyond all calculation.

The first and greatest lesson of the war, then, is this--that the
value of an effective navy, when the time comes for it to manifest
its effectiveness, is out of all proportion to the sums, vast though
these may be, that it has cost; that if it overmatches the opposing
navy decisively enough, the country behind it may rest secure and
serenely indifferent to the thought of invasion or even of attack,
so far as its sea frontier is concerned; and that the navy--still
assuming it to be of commanding strength--may accomplish its whole
mission of defense without ever being called upon to strike a blow.

It can ha