nor look for help
from friends or enemies. The _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_ went
down in the battle off Coronel leaving not a single survivor to tell
the story of their destruction. Following the battle off the
Falkland Islands, the British picked up a few survivors from the
German ships, but not enough to contradict the rule. In the running
engagement in the North Sea on January 25, 1915, the _Bluecher_ went
down with 650 out of 900 of her crew. Scarcely a man was saved from
the _Cressy_, the _Aboukir_, or the _Hogue_. And so the story runs,
and so it must always run when modern ships fight in earnest.

One of the most striking features of the engagements up to the
present time is the range at which they have been fought. A few
years ago 10,000 yards was considered the extreme range at which
ships would open fire. The ranges used in the Russo-Japanese War
varied from 3,000 to 8,000 yards, and the battle off Tsushima was
decided at less than 6,000 yards. In the present war the ranges have
been nearly three times as great as these. In the battle off
Coronel, the _Good Hope_ was sunk at 12,000 yards, the _Monmouth_ at
a little less. In the battle off the Falkland Islands, both sides
opened fire at 17,000 yards, and the German ships were sunk at
approximately 16,000 yards. The running fight in the North Sea
opened at 18,000 yards, and the _Bluecher_ was sunk at 15,000 yards.
This extraordinary increase in the fighting range corresponds in a
measure to an increase in accuracy of fire, but it corresponds also
to a new recognition of the enormous advantage which may result from
a fortunate hit early in the action. The theoretical advantage which
should result from this has been confirmed by practical experience,
and it may be regarded as certain that battle ranges hereafter will
conform more nearly to those off Coronel than to those of Tsushima.

To summarize: The great outstanding naval lesson of the war is this:
That a nation whose navy commands the sea can rest secure, so far as
its sea frontier is concerned, from the fear of invasion or of
serious attack; that, further, its command of the sea insures to its
commerce the freedom of the sea; and that, finally, this freedom
extends equally to its armed forces, to which the highways of the
sea are opened wide, affording a possibility of offense at distant
points which is denied to the forces of the enemy.

Perhaps the lesson second in importance is that, owing to the ra