ria had
already been removed. Between the capitulation of Ulm and the
victory of Friedland there intervened nineteen months. More than
eighteen have now passed since the fall of Liege in the present war.

The Peace of Tilsit made Napoleon the master of Europe with only
Great Britain left in the field against him. The subsequent military
and political history which led to Napoleon's downfall has no
pertinence in the present discussion. What it is essential to
recognize is that the German high command in August, 1914,
approached a Napoleonic problem in the Napoleonic fashion.

In German quarters there had been before the war, and there has been
since, a debate as to the comparative advantage of making the first
campaign against France or against Russia. The fact that the attack
on France failed has doubtless contributed to strengthen the case of
those who held the view of the elder Moltke and advocated an eastern
offensive. But this is merely an academic discussion. What is of
interest to us now is to recognize that Germany did decide to attack
France, that she did direct against the republic the first and
necessarily the greatest blow she could deliver. It was not until
April, 1915, that she actually undertook an attack upon Russia, and
then the prospect of a decisive victory, on the Napoleonic order,
had practically disappeared.

THE ATTACK UPON FRANCE

Turning now to the first campaign, the attack upon France, it is to
be recognized at the outset that the German purpose was to dispose
of France in the military sense for the period of the war by a
campaign that should repeat the success of 1870. It was essential
that this victory should be achieved before France could profit by
Russian activity in the east and before Great Britain could render
material military assistance to her French ally. It was equally
essential that the blow should be so swift and heavy that it would
crush the French before they could equip and organize their great
reserves, for whom, thanks to legislative folly and pacifist
agitation, there was lacking equipment and arms.

For the accomplishment of this great task, Germany counted upon her
superior numbers, the greater speed of her mobilization, and the
excess of her population over France to give her a decisive
advantage. She counted also upon her advantage in heavy artillery
and machine guns, on her organization of motor transport, which was
to establish new records in invasion. Only in