d in
hand with the failure of numbers.

In a word the Allies are fighting a war with many weapons of which
the army is only one and the British navy another, perhaps the most
effective. They are not fighting to win a campaign and they are not
basing their expectation of victory on the incidents in any one
field or in any single campaign. The Germans, on the contrary, as we
have seen, have undertaken three tremendous campaigns, the first to
win an absolute victory on the battle field, a victory which would
make the Germany of William II the successor of the France of
Napoleon I in Europe; the second to dispose of one of the great foes
and thereby win a limited but considerable success; the third to win
peace and an incidental opportunity to expand toward the east, the
only direction in which expansion cannot be checked by sea power.

The Allies still expect to crush Germany; by crushing Germany they
mean bringing her back to her frontiers of 1914, detaching
Alsace-Lorraine from her and possibly Prussian territory east of the
Vistula. They mean to destroy her fleet, demand indemnities for
Belgian and French sufferers, they mean to abolish what they regard
as the Prussian menace to peace. They are fighting Germany as Europe
fought Napoleon and with the same determination. On the German side
the struggle is also being waged in the Napoleonic fashion, Germany
is seeking to employ the Napoleonic method and has so far achieved
something of the early success of the great emperor.

But the simplest fashion in which to describe the later phases of
the conflict is to say that a war of action has become a war of
endurance, that Germany has sought and missed a decision on the
battle field and her foes are now seeking the decision through
economic forces quite as much as military and through casualty lists
rather than brilliant campaigns.

THE WAR CORRESPONDENT

By ARTHUR RUHL

When the American fleet was sent to Vera Cruz in the summer of 1914
and it looked for a time as if an army might go into Mexico, Major
General Funston explained the conditions under which correspondents
were to go to the front. There was to be no repetition of the
scandalous free-for-all of the Spanish War, when news prospectors of
all sorts and descriptions swarmed over to Cuba in almost as
haphazard fashion as Park Row reporters are rushed uptown to cover a
subway explosion or a four-alarm fire.

The number of men was to be limited and thei