sides were
killed and wounded in the same locality. At the lowest estimate,
100,000 men have been killed outright in the Ypres salient, without
either side gaining any appreciable advantage. British regiments
held in the first battle of Ypres in some cases when they had a loss
of 80 per cent.

Both Germans and Allies fought in icy water up to their hips. Many
who survived succumbed to the cold. Lacking proper artillery
support, the British used to cheer when the Germans charged, as that
meant the end of shell fire, and they could come to close quarters
with the bayonet. Little by little, but grudgingly, they had to
yield against that persistent foe. The German staff was at its best
in its organized offensive, and the British at their best
"sticking," as they call it--and the prize was an arm of salt water,
to be all Ally or part German. When the Germans gave up the
struggle, they had the advantage of ground and the British stayed
where they were. Whether or not the Allies should have evacuated
Ypres and the deadly Ypres salient and withdrawn to better strategic
positions will ever be a subject of discussion; but the loss of the
city at the time would have had a moral effect on the situation of
the Allies, and the political consideration may have outweighed the
military.

Thus the campaign of the first summer and fall came to an end. The
Allies had failed in their hope of keeping the German within his
borders; and the German had failed to win any decisive victory
which could enforce peace on all or any one of the Allies.

The casualties, on account of the vast numbers engaged, had been
staggering. Germany held a small strip of Poland, and about the same
amount of territory in France that she was to hold a year later,
while Russia held a large section of Galicia. Where the armies had
operated, lay broad belts of ruins, destroyed at enormous cost by
shell fire. The moralist might well ask if the nations would have
entered the war if they could have foreseen the result of their
first four months' struggle.

SEA POWER

For any adequate understanding of the strategy of the war as a
whole, the trench line from Switzerland to Flanders must be extended
to the east of England across the North Sea to Iceland. This war has
again demonstrated the enormous value of sea power.

Glance at a map of the globe and you will see how small a portion of
it is occupied by the great nations of Europe, which for 2,000 years
have bee