much of the enemy's
territory, and she still maintained the power of the offensive. The
purpose of the Allies was to contain her, to strengthen "the ring of
steel." Her own purpose must be to strike some vital blow which
would win a separate peace either from Russia or France. The moment
she gave up her offensive and settled down to the defensive, which
was naturally against the policy of her staff and the vigorous
nature of her people, she was acknowledging that she had reached the
limit of her prowess. Then the Allies, with the sea at their
command, would bid her await their pleasure--unless she had so far
exhausted them that they considered a decided victory over her
hopeless, and they made a compromise.

Saloniki now being an incident of her military past, the next plan
of her staff was an effort on Verdun, the great fortress which
occupied a salient in the French siege line. Here, as elsewhere when
she attacked, she concentrated both her own and the Austrian heavy
artillery, and following the system of intense artillery
preparation, threw in her waves of infantry. This blow was struck at
the most inclement season of the year, in February snow and slush
and rain, as if to anticipate the allied attack which was generally
thought bound to come later in the spring when sufficient munitions
had been accumulated on the western front and the weather was
favorable.

By this time experts who had thought the war would be decided in the
Balkans had again realized that it never pays to desert the simple
military principle that the decision comes between the main bodies
of armies and not in remote regions from any clash of subsidiary
forces.

Paris or Petrograd in the hands of the Germans might mean such a
decision. Certainly, should the western front be broken by either
side, it would be the most telling blow of the war in both the moral
and the military sense. But after all, was the line of least
resistance for Germany the line of the western front? Would she
really strike her great blow of 1916--if she still had the power to
strike one--against the western rather than the eastern front?
Hitherto, attacks had succeeded against Russia.

It was in Russia that she had had her success. German officers had
always stated their confidence that with their superior gun fire and
tactics they could always force the Russians back. Could they press
back the French and the British?

When would the war end? seemed as unanswerable to