harnessed to a chariot as to one ridden under
the saddle.

The first trace of change is to be found, according to Prof. Wm.
Ridgeway (_Origin and Influence of the Thoroughbred Horse_, p. 243), in
an Egyptian relief showing Nubians mounted on horses of an entirely
different breed, taller and more powerful than any which had gone before
them. These horses appear to have come from the vicinity of Dongola, and
the strain still survives in the Sudan. The breed is traced into Arabia,
where only second-rate horses had been reared hitherto, and thence to
different parts of Europe, where eventually centres of cavalry activity
developed. The first detailed evidence of the existence of organized
bodies of mounted men is to be found in Xenophon, whose instructions for
the breaking, training and command of a squadron remain almost as a
model for modern practice. Their tactical employment, however, seems
still to have been relatively insignificant, for the horses were still
far too small and too few to deliver a charge with sufficient momentum
to break the heavy armed and disciplined hoplites. The strain of ancient
battle was of an entirely different order to that of modern fighting. In
the absence of projectiles of sufficient range and power to sweep a
whole area, the fighting was entirely between the front ranks of the
opposing forces. When a front rank fighter fell, his place was
immediately taken by his comrade in the rear, who took up the individual
combat, excited by his comrade's fate but relatively fresh in mind and
muscle. This process of feeding the fight from the rear could be
protracted almost indefinitely. If then, as a consequence of a charge, a
few mounted men did penetrate the ranks, they encountered such a crowd
of well-protected and fresh swordsmen that they were soon pulled off
their ponies and despatched. Now and again great leaders, Alexander,
Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, for instance, succeeded in riding down
their opponents, but in the main, and as against the Roman infantry in
particular, mounted troops proved of very little service on the
battlefield.

It was, however, otherwise in the sphere of strategy. There, information
was of even greater importance, because harder to obtain, than it is
nowadays, and the army which could push out its feelers to the greater
distance, surround its enemy and intercept his communications, derived
nearly the same advantages as it does at present. Hence both sides
provided