work half done, and matters reverted to their former
condition until the appearance of Cromwell, another great leader capable
of animating his men with the spirit of devotion, again rendered the
cavalry arm supreme. The essence of his success lay in this, that his
men were ready everywhere and always to lay down their lives for their
common cause. Whether scouting 70 m. to the front of their army, or
fighting dismounted to delay the enemy at defiles or to storm fortified
strongholds, or charging home on the battlefield, their will power,
focused on, and in turn dependent on, the personality of their great
leader, dominated all human instincts of fear, rapacity or selfishness.
It is true that they had not to ride against the modern rifle, but it is
equally true that there was no quick-firing artillery to carry terror
through the enemy's army, and it was against masses of spearmen and
musketeers, not then subjected to bursting shells or the lash of
shrapnel and rifle bullets, that the final charges had always to be
ridden home.

Each succeeding decade thereafter has seen a steady diminution in the
ultimate power of resistance of the infantry, and a corresponding
increase in the power of fire preparation at the disposal of the supreme
leader; and the chances of cavalry have fluctuated with the genius of
that leader in the employment of the means at his disposal, and the
topographical conditions existing within each theatre of war. During the
campaigns in Flanders, with its multiplicity of fortresses and clayey
soil, cavalry rapidly degenerated into mounted infantry, throwing aside
sword and lance-proof armour, and adopting long muskets and heavier
ammunition. Presently they abandoned the charge at a gallop and reverted
to an approach at the trot, and if (as at Blenheim) their influence
proved decisive on the field of battle, this was because the conditions
were common to both combatants, and the personal influence of "Corporal
John," as his soldiers called Marlborough, ensured greater steadiness
and better co-operation.

Frederick II.; reform of the Prussian cavalry.

When Frederick II. became king of Prussia (1740), he found his cavalry
almost at the nadir of efficiency; even his cuirassiers drilled
principally on foot. "They can manoeuvre," on foot, "with the same
precision as my grenadiers, but unfortunately they are equally slow."
His enemies the Austrians, thanks to their wars against the Turks who
always charg