ed at a gallop, had maintained greater dash and mobility,
and at Mollwitz the Prussians only escaped disaster by the astounding
rapidity of their infantry fire. In disgust the king then wrote, "Die
Cavallerie is nicht einmal werth dasz sie der Teufel weck holet," and he
immediately set about their reform with his usual energy and
thoroughness. Three years after Mollwitz, the result of his exertions
was apparent in the greatly increased importance the arm acquired on the
battlefield, and the charge of the Bayreuth dragoons at Hohenfriedberg
(June 4, 1745), who with 1500 horses rode over and dispersed 20 Austrian
battalions, bringing in 2500 prisoners and 67 colours, will always rank
as one of the most brilliant feats in military history.[1] The following
years of peace (1745-1756) were devoted to the methodical preparation of
the cavalry to meet the requirements that Frederick's methods of war
would make upon them, and it is to this period that the student should
devote special attention. From the very outbreak of the Seven Years' War
(1756) this training asserted its influence, and Rossbach (1757) and
Zorndorf (1758) are the principal examples of what cavalry handled in
masses can effect. At Rossbach General v. Seydlitz, at the head of 38
squadrons, practically began and ended the destruction of the French
army, and at Zorndorf he saved the day for the Prussians by a series of
the most brilliant charges, which successively destroyed the Russian
right wing and centre. These battles so conclusively demonstrated the
superiority of the Prussian cavalry that their enemies completely
altered their tactical procedure. They now utilized their enormous
numerical superiority by working in two separate armies, each almost as
strong as the whole Prussian force. When the latter moved against
either, the one threatened immediately threw up heavy entrenchments,
against which cavalry were, of course, ineffective, whilst the other
pursued its march. When Frederick, having more or less beaten his
immediate opponent, began to threaten the other army it entrenched
likewise. Against these methods the Prussian army soon wore itself out,
and though from time to time the cavalry locally distinguished itself,
no further opportunities for great decisive blows presented themselves.

The increased demands made upon the mobility of the Prussian horsemen
naturally resulted in the gradual rejection of everything which was not
essential to their striki