marked by no decisive triumphs, the results are always
inadequate when judged by the magnitude of the forces employed, and only
the brilliant exploit of the 15th Light Dragoons (now Hussars) at
Villers en Couche (April 24, 1794) deserves to be cited as an instance
of the extraordinary influence which even a few horsemen can exercise
over a demoralized or untrained mob of infantry.

Up to the campaign of Poland (see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS) French victories
were won chiefly by the brilliant infantry fighting, cavalry only
intervening (as at Jena) to charge a beaten enemy and complete his
destruction by pursuit. But after the terrible waste of life in the
winter of 1806-7, and the appalling losses in battle, Napoleon
introduced a new form of attack. The case-shot preparation of his
artillery (see ARTILLERY) sowed confusion and terror in the enemy's
ranks, and the opportunity was used by masses of cavalry. Henceforward
this method dominated the Napoleonic tactics and strategy. The essential
difference between this system and the Frederician lies in this, that
with the artillery available in the former period it was not possible to
say in advance at what point the intervention of cavalry would be
necessary, hence the need for speed and precision of manoeuvre to ensure
their arrival at the right time and place. Napoleon now selected
beforehand the point he meant to overwhelm and could bring his cavalry
masses within striking distance at leisure. Once placed, it was only
necessary to induce them to run away in the required direction to
overwhelm everything by sheer weight of men and horses. This method
failed at Waterloo because the ground was too heavy, the slope of it
against the charge, and the whole condition of the horses too low for
the exertion demanded of them.

The British cavalry from 1793 to 1815 suffered from the same causes
which at the beginning of the 20th century brought about its breakdown
in the South African War. Over-sea transport brought the horses to land
in poor condition, and it was rarely possible to afford them sufficient
time to recover and become accustomed to the change in forage, the
conditions of the particular theatre of operations, &c., before they had
to be led against the enemy--hence a heavy casualty roll and the
introduction into the ranks of raw unbroken horses which interfered with
the precision of manoeuvre of the remainder. Their losses (about 13% per
annum) were small as compared with t