ng power. The long muskets and bayonets were
laid aside, but the cuirass was retained for the melee, and by the close
of the great struggle the various branches of the arm had differentiated
themselves out into the types still adhered to, heavy cavalry, dragoons,
hussars, whose equipment as regards essentials thenceforward hardly
varied up to the latter years of the 19th century. The only striking
difference lies in the entire rejection of the lance in the armament of
the charging squadrons, and the reason is characteristic of the
principles of the day. The Prussian cavalry had realized that success
was decided, not primarily by actual collision, but by the moral effect
of the appearance of an absolutely closed wall of horsemen approaching
the adversary at full speed. If the necessary degree of cohesion was
attained, the other side was morally beaten before collision took place,
and either turned to flight, or met the shock with so little resolution
that it was ridden over without difficulty. In the former case any
weapon was good enough to kill a flying enemy; in the latter, in the
melee which then ensued, the crush in the ranks of the victors was still
so great that the lance was a hindrance rather than a help.

In the years succeeding the war the efficiency of the Prussian cavalry
sank very rapidly, the initial cause being the death of Seydlitz at the
early age of fifty-two. His personality had alone dominated the
discontent, lethargy and hopelessness created by ruthless financial
economies. When he was gone, as always in the absence of a great leader,
men adapted their lives to the line of least resistance. In thirty years
the wreck was complete, and within the splendid squadrons which had been
accustomed to manoeuvre with perfect precision at the highest speed,
there were (as F.A. von der Marwitz in his _Nachlass_ clearly shows) not
more than seven thoroughly trained men and horses to each, the remainder
being trained for little longer and receiving less attention than is the
case with modern 2nd line or auxiliary cavalry.

Cavalry in the revolutionary wars.

For the generation preceding the outbreak of the French Revolution,
Frederick the Great's army, and especially his cavalry, had become the
model for all Europe, but the mainspring of the excellence of his
squadrons was everywhere overlooked. Seydlitz had manoeuvred great
masses of horsemen, therefore every one else must have great masses
also; but no nat