the mode of Nelson's
last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper published
by Sir Charles Ekins in his book on 'Naval Battles,' and vouched
for by him as the work of an eye-witness--almost certainly, as
Mr. Julian Corbett holds, an officer on board the _Conqueror_ in
the battle. It is a remarkable document. Being critical rather
than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of Clerk
of Eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the
investigation of tactical questions ever published in the English
tongue. On it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable
views expressed concerning the British tactics at Trafalgar. As
it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism
of Nelson's action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we
criticise it in its turn.

Notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually
took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean
tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have
an academic tinge. In fact, they are very much of the kind that a
clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities
inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class
of students. Between a professor of tactics, however clever, and
a commanding genius like Nelson the difference is great indeed.
The writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more
general opinion of his day. He has certainly suggested opinions
to later generations of naval officers. The captains who shared
in Nelson's last great victory did not agree among themselves as
to the mode in which the attack was introduced. It was believed
by some of them, and, thanks largely to the _Conqueror_ officer's
paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas Nelson had
announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast
or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead. Following
up the path of investigation to which, in his article above
mentioned, Admiral Colomb had already pointed, we can, I think,
arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was
adhered to.

Before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be
convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that
Nelson exposed his fleet at Trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting
it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _Conqueror's_
officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in
detail'; and that 'the