rtance. Of course, they
have to be defended, or else they may fall into an opponent's
hands. Have we here a case in which highly localised or even
passive defences are desirable? No doubt we did act for a time
as though we believed that the question could only be answered
in the affirmative; but that was when we were under the influence
of the feelings engendered by observation of the long series of
land wars previously discussed.

Perhaps we have not yet quite shaken off the effects of that
influence; but we have at least got so far as to tolerate the
statement of the other side of the question. It would be a great
mistake to suppose that the places alluded to are meant to be
ports of refuge for our ships. Though they were to serve that
purpose occasionally in the case of isolated merchant vessels, it
would be but an accident, and not the essence, of their existence.
What they are meant for is to be utilised as positions where our
men-of-war can make reasonably sure of finding supplies and the
means of refit. This assurance will largely depend upon their
power of resistance if attacked. Before we can decide how to
impart that power to them we shall have to see the kind of attack
against which they would have to be prepared. If they are on a
continent, like, for example, Gibraltar, attack on them by a
land force, however improbable, is physically possible. Against
an attack of the kind a naval force could give little direct
help. Most of our outlying naval bases are really or virtually
insular, and are open to attack only by an expedition coming
across the sea. An essential characteristic of a naval base is
that it should be able to furnish supplies as wanted to the
men-of-war needing to replenish their stocks. Some, and very
often all, of these supplies are not of native production and
must be brought to the base by sea. If the enemy can stop their
conveyance to it, the place is useless as a base and the enemy is
really in control of its communications. If he is in control of its
communications he can send against it as great an expedition as he
likes, and the place will be captured or completely neutralised.
Similarly, if we control the communications, not only can supplies
be conveyed to it, but also no hostile expedition will be allowed
to reach it. Thus the primary defence of the outlying base is
the active, sea-going fleet. Moderate local defence, chiefly
of the human kind, in the shape of a garrison, will cert