an's refutation of the aspersions
on Nelson's honour and humanity, but also establishes Professor
Laughton's conclusions, reached many years ago, that it was the
orders given to him, and not his amour, which detained him at
Naples at a well-known epoch. The last volume issued by the Society,
that of Mr. Julian Corbett,[83] is, I venture to affirm, the
most useful to naval officers that has yet appeared among the
Society's publications. It will provide them with an admirable
historical introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly
help them in ascertaining the importance of Nelson's achievements
as a tactician. For my own part, I may say with gratitude that
but for Mr. Corbett's valuable work I could not have completed
this appreciation.
[Footnote 82: _Nelson_and_the_Neapolitan_Jacobins_.]
[Footnote 83: _Fighting_Instructions_, 1530-1816.]
The most renowned of Nelson's achievements was that performed
in his final battle and victory. Strange as it may seem, that
celebrated performance has been the subject of much controversy,
and, brilliant as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been
freely, and indeed unfavourably, criticised. There is still much
difference of opinion as to the preliminary movements, and as
to the exact method by which Nelson's attack was made. It has
been often asserted that the method really followed was not that
which Nelson had expressly declared his intention of adopting.
The question raised concerning this is a difficult one, and,
until the appearance of Mr. Julian Corbett's recent work and
the interesting volume on Trafalgar lately published by Mr. H.
Newbolt, had not been fully discussed. The late Vice-Admiral
P. H. Colomb contributed to the _United_Service_Magazine_ of
September 1899 a very striking article on the subject of Nelson's
tactics in his last battle, and those who propose to study the
case should certainly peruse what he wrote.
The criticism of Nelson's procedure at Trafalgar in its strongest
form may be summarised as follows. It is affirmed that he drew
up and communicated to the officers under his orders a certain
plan of attack; that just before the battle he changed his plan
without warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily;
that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and, because of
all this, that the British loss was much heavier and much less
evenly distributed among the ships of the fleet than it need have
been. The most formidable arraignment of
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