he special arrangements made
in the English Channel to oppose the movements of Napoleon's
flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft.
The British strategy at the time of Trafalgar, as far as it was
concerned with opposition to Napoleon's sea-going fleets, may be
succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which
the enemy's forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable
strength. Though some of our admirals, notably Nelson himself,
objected to the application of the term 'blockade' to their plans,
the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they
should come out they would find outside their port a British
force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them
thoroughly and destroy them. Beating them and thus having done
with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what
was desired by our admirals. This necessitated a close watch on
the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let
the history of Cornwallis's command off Brest and of Nelson's
off Toulon suffice to tell us.

The junction of two or more of Napoleon's fleets would have ensured
over almost any single British fleet a numerical superiority that
would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost
certain. To meet this condition the British strategy contemplated
the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another,
which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment
be effected. By this step we should preserve, if not a numerical
superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force
as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment,
even if undefeated, a certainty. The strategic problem before our
navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem.
The enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards Brest
or towards Toulon. In the latter case, a superior force might
fall upon our Mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in
the Atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from
the Atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. Against
the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of Napoleon
to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off
Toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was
to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval
control of the English Channel.

After the addition of the Spanish Navy to his own,