strength of this army is worth attention. By far the
larger part of it was to have made the first descent on our
territory; the remainder was to be a reserve to follow as quickly
as possible. It has been doubted if Napoleon really meant to
invade this country, the suggestion being that his collection
of an army on the shores of the Straits of Dover and the English
Channel was merely a 'blind' to cover another intended movement.
The overwhelming weight of authoritative opinion is in favour
of the view that the project of invasion was real. It is highly
significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary.
It could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval
obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the
expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to
be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected.
The numerical strength in troops which Napoleon thought necessary
compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that
concealment became quite impossible. Consequently an important
part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened
locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of
precision.

Notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of
naval warfare, the Great Emperor had grasped one of its leading
principles. Before the Peace of Amiens, indeed before his campaign
in Egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in Italy, he had seen
that the invasion of the United Kingdom was impracticable without
first obtaining the command of the sea. His strategic plan,
therefore, included arrangements to secure this. The details of
the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered;
but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment
of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied
in Nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. The gunboats,
transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of
many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern France and the
Netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition.
Fleets of line-of-battle ships were essential parts of it, and
on their effective action the success of the scheme was largely
made to depend. This feature remained unaltered in principle when,
less than twelve months before Trafalgar, Spain took part in the
war as Napoleon's ally, and brought him a great reinforcement
of ships and important assistance in money