most perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships.
Moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position
selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed
base.

The defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on
the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route,
viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant.
Within the last few years a good deal has been written about
the employment of cruisers. The favourite idea seems to be that
peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to
take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. The history
of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. We need not forget
Nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number
attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of
vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually
unaltered. At the beginning of 1805, the year of Trafalgar, we
had--besides other classes--232 frigates and sloops in commission;
at the beginning of 1806 we had 264. It is doubtful if forty of
these were attached to fleets.

It is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels
of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep
up with the fighting ships when at sea. This, perhaps, is due
to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on
the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. In
practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very
short time--from its supplies. Its movements depend on those of
its supply-train. The corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet
or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. As long as
these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered,
and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. All
that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right
place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying
that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies
and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called
communications'--the phrase being Mahan's.

The efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely
on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. Why do
we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace
so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails
before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? There are
two reasons. One is, beca