moderate limits, conferred any considerable
tactical advantage in 'single ship actions,' and still less in
general or fleet actions. Taking up a position ahead or astern of
a hostile ship so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated
by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state
of the ship to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather
late in an action.
A remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly
apparent in the era of Trafalgar. I have already alluded to the
tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle ships
to those of the medium classes. The same thing may be noticed
in the case of the frigates.[93] Those of 44, 40, and 28 guns
relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number
of the 38-gun, 36-gun, and 32-gun frigates increased. The officers
who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress
on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the
sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now
call the 'battleship' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.'
In the earlier time there were ships which were intermediate
between the ship of the line and the frigate. These were the
two-deckers of 56, 54, 50, 44, and even 40 guns. They had long
been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never
counted in the frigate classes. They seemed to have held a
nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them
in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured
cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit
for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending
or other cruiser service. The two-deckers just mentioned were
looked upon by the date of Trafalgar as forming an unnecessary
class of fighting ships. Some were employed, chiefly because they
existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true
battleships on one side and true frigates on the other.[94]
[Footnote 93: See footnote 92.]
[Footnote 94: See footnote 92.]
In conclusion, I would venture to say that the strategical and
tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had
been mastered by our navy by the time of the Trafalgar campaign.
The effect of those lessons showed itself in our ship-building
policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history
of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means
to belligerent ends.
|