that Lord St.
Vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats
by gunboats,' &c. He objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or
long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful
to have the sea-going ships manned. Speaking of this coastal
defence scheme, he said: 'It would be a good bone for the officers
to pick, but a very dear one for the country.'

The defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy
of the time. An important part was played by our fleets and groups
of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes
direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral
vessels carrying commodities to or from British ports. The strategy
of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long
belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted
number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity
of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by
the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size. This
can be seen in the lists of successive years. In January 1803
the number of cruising frigates in commission was 107, and of
sloops and smaller vessels 139, the total being 246. In 1804 the
numbers were: Frigates, 108; sloops, &c., 181; with a total of
289. In 1805 the figures had grown to 129 frigates, 416 sloops,
&c., the total being 545. Most of these were employed in defending
commerce. We all know how completely Napoleon's project of invading
the United Kingdom was frustrated. It is less well known that
the measures for defending our sea-borne trade, indicated by the
figures just given, were triumphantly successful. Our mercantile
marine increased during the war, a sure proof that it had been
effectually defended. Consequently we may accept it as established
beyond the possibility of refutation that that branch of our naval
strategy at the time of Trafalgar which was concerned with the
defence of our trade was rightly conceived and properly carried
into effect.

As has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade,
being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of
communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any
rate, of our transmarine territories. Napoleon held pertinaciously
to the belief that British prosperity was chiefly due to our
position in India. We owe it to Captain Mahan that we now know
that the eminent American Fulton--a name of interest to the members
of t