petual apprehension of
descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired
and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and
protracted war. More briefly stated, the hostile plan was to
invade the United Kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel
us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the East, from
which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived. The plan
was comprehensive, but not easily concealed. What we had to do
was to prevent the invasion of the United Kingdom and defend our
trade and our outlying territories. As not one of the hostile
objects could be attained except by making a maritime expedition
of some kind, that is to say, by an expedition which had to cross
more or less extensive areas of water, it necessarily followed
that our most effective method of defence was the keeping open
of our sea communications. It became necessary for us to make
such arrangements that the maritime paths by which a hostile
expedition could approach our home-coasts, or hostile cruisers
molest our sea-borne trade, or hostile squadrons move to the
attack of our trans-marine dependencies--that all these paths
should be so defended by our navy that either the enemy would
not venture to traverse them or, if he did, that he could be
driven off.

Short as it is, the time at my disposal permits me to give a
few details. It was fully recognised that defence of the United
Kingdom against invasion could not be secured by naval means
alone. As in the times of Queen Elizabeth, so in those of George
III, no seaman of reputation contended that a sufficient land
force could be dispensed with. Our ablest seamen always held
that small hostile expeditions could be prepared in secret and
might be able to slip through the most complete lines of naval
defence that we could hope to maintain. It was not discovered
or alleged till the twentieth century that the crew of a dinghy
could not land in this country in the face of the navy. Therefore
an essential feature of our defensive strategy was the provision
of land forces in such numbers that an invader would have no
chance of succeeding except he came in strength so great that
his preparations could not be concealed and his expedition could
not cross the water unseen.

As our mercantile marine was to be found in nearly every sea,
though in greater accumulation in some areas than in others, its
defence against the assaults of an enemy could only be ensured