the
doctrine of a creation would cut up his system by the roots. The radical
difference, in fact, between Theism and Pantheism mainly consists in
this: that the former regards creation as distinct from the Creator, as
the product of His omnipotent and free will, as the object of His
constant providential care, as the subject of His supreme control and
government; whereas the latter represents it as a necessary _emanation_
from the Divine substance, as an eternal _development_ of the uncreated
Essence; the finite, in all its forms, being a "mode" of the infinite,
and the temporary phases of nature so many transient but ever-renewed
manifestations of the unchangeable and eternal. These two conceptions
are diametrically opposed; they cannot admit of conciliation or
compromise; and hence the daring attempt of Spinoza to prove the
impossibility of creation, even when he admits the existence of an
Infinite and Eternal Being.
5. The system of Spinoza is vicious, because it involves erroneous
conclusions respecting both the _body_ and the _soul_. He denies that
they are "substances." And why? Because, _by the definition_, "a
substance" is that which is self-existent, and may be conceived without
reference to any other being. Be it so. What does this argument amount
to? Why, simply to this, that they are not gods. What, then, are they?
Created beings? No. And why? Because creation is impossible, and, also,
because whatever exists must be either a "substance," or an "attribute,"
or a "mode." What then? Clearly not an "attribute," for the only
attributes known to us are extension and thought, and these attributes
are as infinite as "the substance" to which they belong; they must
therefore be "modes" or "affections" of that "substance." But in what
sense? In the sense of being created, and therefore dependent,
existences, whose nature and origin cannot be conceived of or accounted
for without reference to the Being who produced them at first, and still
continues to maintain them? No; for in that sense all Theists admit the
derivation and dependence of every finite being; but they must be
"modes" or "affections" of the one uncreated essence, mere phenomenal
manifestations of it. The soul, whose essence is thought, is a mere
succession of ideas. The body is a mere "mode" of the Divine "attribute"
of extension; and neither the one nor the other can be described as a
_distinct being_. They are affections, and nothing more, of the one
|